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Abstract 
The Theory of the Second Best implies that any country with less-than-ideal resources can lose 
from international trade. Recently it has been suggested this means the South (poor countries) are better 
off suppressing trade with the North, especially trade in natural resource products, since the North has 
better developed rights to protect its natural resources. Here we show that the suppression of such trade 
may also impede the development of property rights in the South, but that even taking this into account, 
trade liberalization need not improve Southern welfare.  We find that within a cone of world prices on the 
boundary of which lies the South’s autarky price vector, welfare losses still occur even when local 
governments in the South make optimal choices to enclose the hinterlands. Corollary to the losses, the 
South can gain from tariffs or quotas and, within a proper subset of the cone of loss, can suffer when the 
prices of its exports rise.  
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Unprotected Resources and Voracious World Markets 
Michael Margolis and Jason F. Shogren 
Introduction 
North-South trade—by which is meant trade between rich (North) and poor (South) 
countries—is, by most measures, less free than trade within either set of countries. The most 
trade-distorting policies in the North, for example, discourage the import of textiles and 
agricultural commodities, which would rank high among Southern export markets in a world of 
free trade. Partly as a result, there is less North-South trade compared to North-North trade than 
simple consideration of comparative advantages would lead one to expect (Helpman 1999). And 
whatever their intent, the demands in Europe and the United States that environmental and labor 
standards be used to block imports or foreign direct investment are likely, if accommodated, to  
increase the bias against North-South trade. 
 Chichilnisky (1994) has famously argued that this bias may be beneficial, both globally 
and to the South. The difference between the two sets of nations, she argued, is largely a 
difference in the efficiency of institutions. In a world where nations are otherwise identical, and 
otherwise satisfy the conditions for perfectly functioning market systems, she proved that the 
South ends up exporting the output of its poorly governed activities. More liberal trade thus 
causes the South increasingly to specialize in those sectors that are most plagued by institutional 
deficiency. This suggests the South is better off if specialization according to this source of 
comparative advantage is suppressed. If, as in Chichilnisky’s model, the institutional difference 
driving trade is that natural resources in the South are exploited under open access conditions, 
then the appropriate intervention reduces export of Southern natural resource products. By 
extension, the failure of Southern societies to develop effective pollution policies could justify Resources for the Future  Margolis and Shogren 
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the protection of pollution-intensive industries in the North and barriers to Northern direct 
investment in the South. 1  
This paper examines a deep objection to that argument—that it treats institutions as 
though they were social endowments rather than social creations. In reality, of course, the 
enforcement of property rights or regulations requires resources (Demsetz 1969). Those choosing 
to allocate resources to enforcement must expect to gain at least as much by doing so as they 
would if the resources dedicated to enforcement  were instead used to produce for markets. The 
process by which the South loses from trade (outlined below) is driven by an increase in the 
domestic price of whatever gets harvested from the open access resource, and as that price rises 
so does the reward to anyone expending the effort to control access. It seems likely that if the 
response to that incentive is optimal, the classic result that all nations gain from trade will be 
restored. 
We show herein that this is not the case for one important class of property-rights 
formation systems. Specifically, we assume the act of property-rights formation is locally 
discrete, meaning a given parcel is either private property or open access; and that it is locally 
optimal, so that a parcel is private property (in equilibrium) if and only if the rents it generates 
are greater than the cost of turning it into private property; this process is known as “enclosure” 
                                                 
1 Chichinisky did not actually prove that the South would lose from trade—only that its problem-ridden sector 
would grow.  She believed she had proven it, but a close reading of the results to which she referred when asserting 
that the South is worse off actually demonstrated that Southern real income under trade was lower than Northern 
real income under trade—not lower than Southern real income under autarky. The possibility of actual losses has 
since been proven in particular contexts in Brander, J. and M. S. Taylor (1997). International Trade Between 
Consumer and Conservationist Countries, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper: 6006: 35. and 
Brander, J. A. and M. S. Taylor (1998). “Open Access Renewable Resources: Trade and Trade Policy in a Two-
Country Model.” Journal of International Economics 44(2): 181-209. and for the case of all perfectly-competitive 
small-country worlds in Margolis, M. (2001). "Unprotected Resources and Voracious World Markets." Economics 
and Finance. Laramie, University of Wyoming.. Resources for the Future  Margolis and Shogren 
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(Cohen and Weitzman 1975). 2  Under these assumptions (and others made for analytical 
convenience) we show that for any country there exists a range of relative world-market prices 
(the cone of loss)  within which that country will lose from trade. As is the case with property 
rights exogenous, the cone of loss consists of world prices causing the country to specialize in 
resource-intensive production, so that in a North-South world it is only the South that can lose.  
It is natural to model this sort of property rights formation as the expansion of an 
ownership frontier through what we call a  “hinterland”: a set of natural resources that can be 
exploited independently of one another, and that vary in quality so that some may be worth 
owning while others are not (assuming property rights are costly to enforce). A hinterland in the 
usual sense - the land far from the civilization – is one example; quality in that case measures 
largely the cost of transportation to market centers. More generally, a nation’s collection of 
fisheries, oil pools, or forests is a hinterland, with quality measuring costs of extraction and 
excellence of output.  
To illustrate both the definition and the theory on which we build, consider a large 
grassland from which the output is wild grain, gathered in baskets. As more gatherers enter this 
grassland, each finds that she more frequently experiences the frustration of wandering into a 
region that has recently been harvested, so that harvest-per-gatherer declines as the number of 
gatherers increases. If the gatherers have no capacity to coordinate their actions, equilibrium 
occurs when the value of the grain each sells falls to the prevailing wage.  If this grassland is 
small compared to the domestic economy, so that the removal of workers from other sectors does 
                                                 
2 De Meza, D. and J. Gould (1994). “The Social Efficiency of Private Decisions to Enforce Property Rights.” 
Journal of Political Economy 100(3): 561-580. is the only previous general equilibrium model with the locally 
optimal enclosure rule of which we are aware. As did we, they built on Cohen, J. S. and M. L. Weitzman (1975). “A 
Marxian Model of Enclosures.” Journal of Development Economics (1): 287-336. in which it was shown that even a 
social-income raising enclosure lowers wages.  De Meza and Gould’s  was a one-country model only, with 
homogeneous land and the cost of enclosure constant in money rather than (as below) labor, but aside from that the 
one-country model below is almost the same as theirs. De Meza and Gould showed that the locally optimal 
enclosure rule does not in general result in the optimal level of enclosure. Instead, too much may be enclosed, as the 
rewards to enclosure end up including not only the increment it adds to social product, but also a bit redistributed 
from laborers. This over-enclosure, occurs under autarky in the model of this paper. Because there is not a DMG 
inefficiency under trade, however, over-enclosure does not play a role in determining whether real income rises with 
the world price of grain. A full discussion of the DMG behavior of this model can be found in Margolis (2000). Resources for the Future  Margolis and Shogren 
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not change the wage then, at this equilibrium, the same national population gets the same income 
it would if the grassland were removed from the national economy. The rents the grassland could 
have provided are said, in this, case to have been “dissipated.”3 In our model, this pure, open 
access is a limiting case.   
We depart from that limiting case by assuming hinterland workers can capture some of 
the dissipated rent through enclosure. A firm could do it, but enclosure is more realistically 
envisioned as an act of local government, perhaps created for just that purpose (North and 
Thomas 1973; Umbeck 1981). This renders somewhat artificial our assumption that enclosure 
decisions are locally optimal, since the systems of property rights created by these local 
governments are public goods4. A public good is more likely to be provided if the benefits from 
doing so exceed the costs, so the assumption may be thought of as a first approximation, but we 
have been motivated chiefly by the intuition that, if any assumption about enclosure would 
restore the classical gains from trade result, this would be the one. It would be of little interest to 
show that the deficiencies of local decisionmakers add up to a national deficiency. What we find 
is a national failure being generated by perfect local governments.  
That a national deficiency which is itself unrelated to trade can make trade harmful is true 
quite generally. This follows from the theory of the second best, in which it is shown that a 
departure from perfectly competitive conditions in any one market renders the allocation of 
resources in all markets inefficient (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956).5  Chichilnisky’s case against 
North-South trade can be understood as combining the theory of the second best with the insight 
that international differences in institutional quality can yield a North-South trade pattern. That is 
                                                 
3 Rent dissipation has been thoroughly described by, inter alia,  Gordon (1954); Hardin (1969);  Dasgupta and Heal 
(1979); and Wenders, J. T. (1987). “On Perfect Rent Dissipation.” American Economic Review 77(3): 456-59. 
4 Although mechanisms have been designed that can yield optimal provision of public goods in theory, none is as 
simple, or as close to anything observed in history, as a  competitive market for private goods. 
5 More precisely,  R. G. Lipsey and K. Lancaster (1956) show that if there are n different uses among which a nation 
allocates its resources, there are n-1 independent conditions necessary and sufficient for the allocation to be Pareto 
efficient. Each of these conditions deals with one pair of resource uses, and states that the marginal rate of 
substitution between them must equal the marginal rate of transformation. What the theory of the second best says is 
that if any one of these conditions cannot be fulfilled, the remaining n-2 conditions are, in general, no longer 
consistent with efficiency.  Resources for the Future  Margolis and Shogren 
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why her results differ from those of Copeland and Taylor (1994) who explained the same North-
South trade patterns on the basis of a model without market failures. In that model, the North is 
rich because it owns more human capital; because it is rich, it demands more environmental 
quality, which is achieved through government decision to issue fewer pollution permits; and 
because permits are scarce in the North, the South specializes in dirty industries. In Copeland 
and Taylor (1994), losses from trade are not possible.  
The application of the theory of the second best to the gains from trade question is, in 
fact, one of the earliest statements of that theory (Pareto 1909; Bohm 1987) and many of the 
theoretically valid arguments against free trade are instances of this insight.6 Our argument goes 
beyond second-best reasoning, because in our model there is no institutional failure—just a cost 
to protecting property rights. It seems likely that at least some of the other arguments for trade 
intervention can also be extended beyond their origins in the second-best world to cases in which 
the underlying failure can be fixed at cost.  
Hotte, Long, et al. (2000) made the only previous attempt to address this phenomenon, 
and they, too, find an example of “immiserizing trade.” Both property rights formation and 
resource exploitation were treated dynamically in that model, resulting in so rich a set of 
behaviors that nothing could be demonstrated except by numerical example. Our static model, 
although less descriptively satisfying, is better suited to illustrate the central intuition and the 
deep connection to second-best theory, and allows us to prove a more general result—that there 
must always be a (non-null) cone of loss for any country with unenclosed hinterland. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines a baseline model 
and presents the benchmark thesis that trade hurts the South under exogenous property rights.   
Section 3 explores the robustness of this benchmark once we allow property rights to be 
endogenously selected by the South.  Section 4 contains concluding comments.  
                                                 
6 See Krishna, P. and A. Panagariya (2000). “A Unification of Second Best Results in International Trade.” Journal 
of International Economics 52(2): 235-57. and Gordon, R. L. (1994). Regulation and Economic Analysis: A Critique 
Over Two Centuries, Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series. Boston and Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic..  Resources for the Future  Margolis and Shogren 
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The Baseline Model and Comparative Benchmark  
The model we use as baseline is a dual7 to Chichilnisky (1994) and more general in that it 
allows for any number of traded goods, as long as there are at least two.  The level of enclosure 
is exogenous, and is set higher in the North than in the South. The two sets of nations are 
otherwise identical. Grain, the output of the hinterland, is used as an input to domestic 
production.  Except for open access on the hinterland, the economy has a complete set of 
perfectly competitive markets. The allocation of grain among sectors is optimal, as is the 
allocation of remaining labor after grain is produced. We also brush aside a theoretical curio 
(Margolis 2001) by assuming grain supply is well-behaved—cheaper grain, or cheaper wages, 
increases the allocation of labor to the hinterland. This model encompasses a wide variety of 
institutional failures.6    
Households have identical and homothetic preferences. Consumers therefore maximize a 
social utility function identical to the household utility function, subject to the constraint that 
total spending not exceed social income. We represent this using the dual to the social utility 
function, the social expenditure function x(p,u),  where p is the vector of consumer goods prices 
and u the level of social utility; assume x(p,u) is increasing, linearly homogenous and concave in 
prices and increasing in utility; and the derivative with respect to any given price is the quantity 
demanded of the corresponding good (Dixit and Norman 1980).  
All the outputs are produced by combining two inputs: labor, n, and grain, g.  Labor is 
available in the fixed endowment N.  Grain is an intermediate input, which is produced by 
applying labor to land. Land itself does not appear as a variable; rather the scarcity of land is 
represented by diminishing returns in the production of grain. Labor and grain are used to 
produce a vector of consumer goods y, of the same dimension as p.  Define n
G as the labor used 
to harvest grain, and n
R
  as the amount remaining for use in the consumer goods sectors.    
                                                 
7 In general, two models are said to be dual if they are alternative representations of the same process. In economics, 
it is traditional to refer to models that depart from production functions as “primal” and to alternatives that embed 
the production function into something else—such as a cost function, or in this case a national revenue function—as 
the “dual.” 
 Resources for the Future  Margolis and Shogren 
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The sectors producing y are thus allocating n
R and G, which would be called factor 
endowments if they weren’t endogenous.  Let Y(n
R, G)  be the set output combinations that can 
be produced from n
R and G.  Assuming perfectly competitive markets, firms’ output choices 
maximize the market value of output,  y p⋅ , subject to the condition that y can be produced, 
taking p as fixed. The behavior of this set of markets can thus be represented by the national 
revenue function 
 
)} G , n ( Y : { max ) G , n , ( R
R R ∈ ⋅ = y y p p
y  
We now adopt a set of assumptions, probably stricter than necessary, that make possible 
the use of a powerful body of received theory. First, assume all technology is linearly 
homogeneous and there is no joint production of consumer goods. Then the revenue functions is 
increasing, concave, and linearly homogeneous in price (p) and in the pair (n
R,G); its first 
derivative with respect to the i
th element of p is the quantity produced of commodity i; the 
derivative with respect to n
R is the (demand) wage; and the derivative with respect to G is the 
(demand) price of grain (Woodland 1982; Dixit and Norman 1980).7 
 Second, assume there are no factor intensity reversals8 in any technology and that each 
country produces at least two goods (because there are two factors). Then the prices of labor and 
grain are functions only of the prices of tradable goods, p, and not of the quantities of the inputs 
or any other endogenous variable (Blackorby, Schworm et al. 1986). Combined with the last of 
the four envelope results above, this implies the partial derivatives of the revenue function with 
respect to n
R and G are functions of p only, and can be written RG(p) and Rn(p). 
 The ratio of those two factor prices determines the allocation of labor between n
G and n
R. 
Let the production function for grain be  ) n ( F G
G = , where F is assumed increasing and strictly 
concave.  If all land were privately held, the amount of grain production is chosen to solve 





p p − , yielding the first order condition  
  ) n ( F
) ( R








Rent dissipation occurs when more labor is allocated to the hinterland than the level that Resources for the Future  Margolis and Shogren 
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satisfies (1). Because marginal product declines, this means that, at a rent dissipating 
equilibrium, the factor price ratio Rn/Rp is above F′(n
G). We capture this by assuming a function 
Φ(n
G) exists that gives, for each level of n
G, the ratio of grain price to wage which results in n
G 





n ) (n F ) (n
n
) (n F
∀ ′ > Φ ≥
 (2)   
    
In the case of complete rent dissipation, Φ(n
G) is the average product curve, which is 
decreasing in n
G. Assume  ()
G n0 ′ Φ<  even when rent dissipation is partial. The extent to which 
institutional conditions allow rents to be dissipated is represented by the size of the gap between 
Φ and F. The equilibrium condition determining n
G is, by definition, 
  ) n (
) ( R







Factor price inelasticity implies the left side is constant in n
G, and the right hand side is a 
decreasing function of n
G, so at most one interior solution exists. With n
G determined by (3), n
R 
is fully determined by the full employment requirement and G by the production function F. 
A country is characterized as a fixed population N; the tastes of that population, 
represented in x(p,u); a revenue function R summarizing all technologies in the consumer goods 
sectors; a function F summarizing grain-production technology and land endowment; and a 
function Φ which contains the information in F plus a measure of property rights failure. The 
endogenous variables are the labor allocations n
R and n
G; the grain output G; the consumer goods 
output vector y; the prices of those goods p; and the social utility level u. We have shown how 
all of these are determined except for p and u.  
Under free trade, prices are set on world markets, which for a small country renders p 
exogenous. The social utility level is determined by 
RT R( ,n ,G)=x( ,u ) pp , and is the highest level 
that can be bought with the social income R. The solution to social utility is unique because R is 
strictly concave and x is strictly convex (p is a bounding hyperplane), which completes the Resources for the Future  Margolis and Shogren 
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model for an open economy. 
 Under autarky, the model is completed with the requirement that domestic markets clear 
) u , ( x ) G , n , ( R
A R p p p p = .  Subscripts still indicate the gradient in price space of the subscripted 
function, and u
A refers to the particular level of social utility that obtains in autarkic equilibrium.  
Given there are as many equations as there are consumer goods, this closes the model by 
determining the equilibrium price vector p. 
In this framework Margolis (2001) proves the following: 
Benchmark theorem:  In a world of otherwise identical countries with exogenously 
determined property rights, let Φ(n
G) differ between, but not within two sets of, nations —North 
and South—such that the Φ(n
G) function in the South lies everywhere above that in the North.  
Under free trade 
 1) The North has higher income than the South.    
2) The North is a net importer of the services of the hinterland, and a net exporter of the 
services of labor. The South is a net importer of the services of labor, and a net exporter of the 
services of the hinterland.  
3) The North always gains from trade. 
4)The South loses if the world price is within the “cone of loss”, which is a convex set of 
price vectors bounded by a ray through the autarky price vector. 
The benchmark theorem is illustrated in Figure 1 for the case of a two good world, where 
good one is more grain-intensive than the other (numeraire) good. R gives national income as a 
function of the price of good one; x gives the cost of achieving the autarky utility level. These 
two are, of course, equal at the autarky price, since the autarky level is the best that can be 
bought with the autarky income at the autarky price. In a country with no market failures (that is, 
where F′ Φ= ) the two curves are tangent at the autarky price. This is because the slope of R is 
the quantity produced of good one, the slope of x is the quantity consumed, and, in autarky, those 
quantities are equal. This tangency means there is no price for which x(p1)>R(p1). 
With rent dissipation on the hinterlands ( F′ Φ > ), the revenue and expenditure curves Resources for the Future  Margolis and Shogren 
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cross at the autarky price, because the revenue function is flatter. Intuitively, this is because part 
of the income gain from a price increase is lost to dissipation. A price interval, therefore, exists 
to the right of the autarky price for which social revenue is insufficient to buy any bundle of 
goods providing the autarky level of equilibrium. This is the cone of loss (the shaded area in 
Figure (1), Part 2) of the benchmark theorem establishes that the world price must be to the right 
of the South’s autarky price, so that it may be in the South’s cone of loss but never the North’s. It 
is also possible for the world price to be beyond the South’s cone of loss, in which case no 
country loses from trade. 
If the world price is within the Southern cone of loss then the South can gain from a 
positive tariff. In Figure 1, a Southern tariff would be represented as a domestic price somewhat 
to the left of the world price, since the South imports the numeraire. The optimal tariff for the 
South will be close to the prohibitive tariff (which makes the domestic price equal to the autarky 
price) since losses from trade occur in the neighborhood of the autarky price.8 Note also that, 
near the right-side boundary of the cone of loss, a small tariff is harmful even though a large one 
is still good. And in the left-hand region of the cone of loss, a world price change that would be 
called an “improvement” in the South’s terms of trade will actually leave the South worse off. 
These benchmark results—losses from trade, a positive optimal tariff, and perverse terms of 
trade impacts—appear in many contexts, and always appear together because all three are 
aspects of the theory of the second best. Any market failure, in this case open access on the 
hinterland, creates a region in price space with these characteristics. 
If a policymaker under the influence of these benchmark results were to impose a tariff, 
quota, ban or any other sort of impediment to international trade, it would function by driving 
down the domestic price of grain. Lower grain price means less potential rent on the hinterland, 
so less gets dissipated. But a lower grain price is also likely to discourage hinterland residents 
from investing in the institutional developments required to capture that rent. The second-best 
solution may thus prevent the implementation of the first best solution. This is the problem to 
                                                 
8 We do not know whether it is possible for the revenue gained from a small tariff to offset the losses from trade, so 
we cannot state as proven that the optimal tariff is actually prohibitive.  Resources for the Future  Margolis and Shogren 
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which we now turn. We will show that when enclosure is endogenous, trade intervention does 
indeed slow institutional development; but there is still a cone of loss, and thus still prices at 
which intervention can be justified.   
Trade with endogenous property 
The One-Country Model   
There are two goods. Cloth, the numeraire good, is produced using only labor, assuming 
a fixed-coefficient production function.  Let Nc represent the amount of labor dedicated to cloth 
production, ac the amount of labor needed to produce one unit of cloth and C total cloth 
produced, such that 
  cc Na C =  (4) 
Perfect competition for labor implies the unit cost of cloth production must equal its 







The only factor other than labor is land, which varies systematically in quality. Let q(l) 
denote the quality of the l
th parcel of land.  For convenience, the size of the parcel is 
infinitesimal and land is indexed by the real numbers [0,L]. Without loss of generality these are 
ordered such that q′(l)≤0. 
Land and labor are used to produce grain, G.   Assume production is multiplicatively 
separable in land quality and labor, such that the output from parcel l is:  
  [ ] g( ) q( ) n( ) =φ lll  (6) 
where n(l) is labor allocated to production on parcel on l, and φ(n) is increasing and strictly 




G= q( ) n( ) d φ ∫ ll l  (7) Resources for the Future  Margolis and Shogren 
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Let p be the price of grain. If a parcel is enclosed, its owner maximizes rent, ρ(l)=pg(l)-
wn(l),  subject to (6). The resulting first order condition gives labor demand, n
*(l), that satisfies 
 
* pq( ) n ( ) w ′ φ =  ll (8) 
Equation (8) expresses the familiar condition that the competitive wage equals the value 
of marginal product. 
Any worker is free to produce grain on open land, and to keep an amount of grain 
proportional to the amount of labor he applies to the parcel.  Only enclosure can restrain workers 
from exploiting the land. This leads to the usual full-rent-dissipation condition for equilibrium of 
an open access resource, which is that the value of average product equals the wage.  Defining 
) ( n ˆ l  as the (endogenous) population that fulfills that condition on parcel l  
  ˆˆ pq( ) [n( )]=wn( ) φ ll l  (9) 
Assume the amount of labor required to enclose one parcel is fixed at a level denoted E.  Since 
the aggregate gains from enclosing a parcel are ρ(l), the locally optimal enclosure rule is to 
enclose if and only if ρ(l) > wE.  The following lemma establishes that a marginal parcel, l
*, 
exists such that land between parcel 0 and l
* is enclosed and land beyond l
* left open.  
Lemma 1:  ρ′(l)<0 if q′(l)<0, and ρ′(l)=0 if 
q′(l)=0. Therefore, there exists an l
* such that [0,l
*] is 
enclosed and (l
*, L] is open. 
Proof: See appendix. 
Assuming an interior l








The landlord’s first order condition (8)determines the labor density up to l
*.  Beyond l
*, 









ˆ N E n ( ,w,p)d n( ,w,p)d N ++ + = ∫∫
l
l
ll l l l  (11)
spent by landlords in meetings to form local governments.10 The third term, the integral from 
zero to l
*,
 is the workforce employed by those landlords to gather grain; and the integral from l
* 
to L is the workforce on the open-access land. 
Finally, all households in the world possess the same homothetic preferences, which is 
expressed in the expenditure function 
  x(p,u) min(C pG)s.t.U(C,G) u =+ ≥  (12) 
where U(C,G) is the utility function. 
Under free trade, (16) through (23) determine G,C,l
*, and the labor gradient {n(l)}on the 
basis of p, N,ac, and {q(l)}.  In autarky, equilibrium occurs where the grain market clears 
 
AA
p Gx ( p , u ) =  (13) 
and social income equals expenditure 
 
AA pG C x(p ,u ) +=  (14) 
Next we derive the equilibrium conditions that apply for a small country under free trade. 
                                                                                                                                                             
9 We have little to say about the corner solutions, in which l
*=0 or l
*=L (the whole land endowment).  The former 
case is pure open access, and thus a parameterization of the model posed in Section 2.  The latter is pure private 
ownership, and hence a parameterization of the standard trade model. Resources for the Future  Margolis and Shogren 
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Small Country Equilibrium 
Assuming the price is fixed (the small country assumption), equations (4)-(11) jointly 
determine the supply of cloth and grain (G and C), the enclosure level (l
*), the population 
gradient (n(l)), the wage (w) and the rent gradient ρ(l). The values of those variable derived with 
prices exogenous will be denoted by a superscript T, for trade, and constitute predictions for the 
behavior of the economy under free trade, assuming the country is small and that the world 
prices fall within its cone of diversification (an interval of p).  We first consider the 
economywide impact of the enclosure decision, and then quantify the impact on that decision of 
a change in the price of grain.  We then bring these calculations together to derive the supply 
curves for grain and cloth.  
How enclosure affects the economy depends on the shift in labor.   Enclosing a parcel 
always means employing fewer farmers and more police.  The following lemma establishes that 
enclosure of the marginal parcel results in a net saving of labor.    
Lemma 2: The difference in labor density under 
ownership regimes,  $ () ()
* nn ll − , is a declining function 
of l and is greater than E at l
*. 
Proof: See Appendix.  
Intuitively, enclosure of 
* l
 produces no rent net of enclosure cost, which is what makes it 
the marginal parcel. If there were no labor savings net of the labor used in enclosure, then the 
enclosure of the marginal parcel would be a losing proposition, because less output is produced 
after the parcel is enclosed. 
Now consider the impact of price on property rights formation.  As long as the economy 
is not completely specialized in grain production, expression (5) holds, and the nominal wage is 
constant.  Since E is constant by construction, 
* ρ() = w E l only remains true as p changes if 
                                                                                                                                                             
10 This is because the enforcement and organizing time add up (by assumption) to E on each parcel, so the total is E 
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The first term in the expanded derivative is the amount of grain produced on the marginal 
parcel. The next measures the impact on rent of the labor change on the marginal parcel induced 
by a price change. Higher p means higher 
* n() l  which increases revenue—which is the first 
term in the coefficient—and cost, which is the second.  
The term in square brackets measures the influence of the price-induced shift in 
* l.   T h e  
first term within those brackets measures the revenue change as one moves down the quality 
gradient; the second measures the indirect impact at 
* l  on both revenue and cost through the 
labor market.  This term has exactly the same coefficient as the derivatives of 
* n() l  with respect 















where the sign follows because g(l), p and φ[n] are all positive and q′(l)<0.  This shows that for 
a small country, an increase in the price of grain causes greater enclosure.  
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which is calculated by totally differentiating (6)-(11), removing terms made zero by (8)and (9), 
and rearranging.   Resources for the Future  Margolis and Shogren 
16 
The first term on the left-hand side captures the impact of landowner production 
decisions on supply, and has a positive sign.11  The second term reflects the impact of laborer 
decisions to work the open access land, and is negative.12  The third term shows the impact of the 
enclosure decision, and is novel. The numerator is total output from the marginal parcel (if 
enclosed) multiplied by the difference in output on that parcel caused by enclosure. The total 
output term scales the impact—it is more significant to enclose highly productive land.  The 
denominator is approximately the gradient (slope in l) of the value of output conditional on land 
being enclosed.  The steeper this gradient, the smaller the impact of the whole term, reflecting 
that less new enclosure follows a price increase if land quality is falling off quickly. Because 
* n n ˆ >  and φ′(n)>0, the bracketed difference in the numerator is positive. Every other element of 
the third term is also positive except q′(l).  Therefore, the third term is negative. 
The negative third term makes the sign of the slope of grain supply ambiguous. Consider 
a segment of land on which the quality gradient is very flat, indicating that much of the land is of 
about the same quality. The first two terms in the supply curve slope are unaffected, but the third 
becomes infinite as q′(l)→0. Hence, the grain supply curve may have downward sloping 
segments, corresponding to flat quality regions of the gradient.  
The slope of the cloth supply curve should be negative in p, since p is the inverse of the 
price of cloth.  Substituting from the total derivative of (8) into that of (5)and setting all 
differential terms other than dC and dp to zero 
                                                 
11 On each enclosed parcel, the slope of the supply curve has the usual form of the squared marginal product over 
price times the second derivative of the production function (times –1.)  These are summed over all enclosed parcels 
in the first integral. Every element of the integrand is positive except φ″[n
*(l)]. The integrand is therefore negative at 
each l, and the minus sign in front makes the whole term positive. 
12 Here, too, the integrand has the general form of a supply function slope, in this case the supply function of an 
open access resource with complete rent dissipation: marginal times total product over the difference between the 
value of marginal product and the value of the outside option (again time –1.) The numerator consists of all positive 
terms. The denominator is ∂ρ(l) /∂n(l) - the derivative with respect to labor of rent on parcel l. By (20), ∂ρ(l) 
/∂n(l)=0 at n
*(l). Because 
* n n ˆ >  (more people work land if access is not controlled) and ∂
2ρ(l) /∂[n(l)]<0, ∂ρ(l) 
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Everything inside the large square brackets is a shift of labor, multiplied by w. The 
integrals are shifts into grain production, and are negative. The terms in parentheses, which 
multiplies the third term, is positive by Lemma 2, so this supply curve, too, is ambiguous.  
The World Economy Model 
North, South, and the pattern of trade 
Consider a world of identical consumers and nations described by the above model. 
Trade can emerge in such a world if there is any international difference in endowments, N and 
{q(l)}; in technology, ac and { φ(n)}; or in enclosure cost, E. We focus on the last, which is the 
only one novel to this model and sufficient to illustrate the points. It should be noted, however, 
that the traditional Heckshire-Ohline results relating trade flows to endowments, or Ricardo’s 
result relating trade flows to technology, will not always hold. If trade prices wind up in the 
back-bending segment of the supply curves, a country with more labor than its trading partners 
could end up exporting grain. But such equilibria are unstable.  
Enclosure costs may differ among nations because institutional histories differ—legal 
precedents, for example, may render the citizens of one nation more confident that the federal 
authorities will respect local property systems.  For another example, if it costs more to patrol a 
larger area, E is higher in countries with less fertile land, because a larger parcel is required to 
get the same production function φ(n).  Alternatively, E may be larger because the resource is 
more difficult to monitor, i.e., an aquifer that bubbles into many surface springs relative to one 
that rises into few. 
Theorem 1 establishes that the differences in enclosure cost are indeed of the North-
South type—the North is richer and encloses more land; the South is poorer and encloses less 
land. 
Theorem 1: In a world of otherwise identical countries, let E differ between, but not 
within, two sets of nations, North and South, such that the E
S>E
N
. Under free trade, the North has Resources for the Future  Margolis and Shogren 
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higher income and more land enclosed than the South. (Proof: See Appendix.)  
We now show the direction of trade is ascertained by appealing to the general principle 
of comparative advantage—a good flows into those countries where its relative autarky price is 
high (Dixit and Norman, 1984).  This makes the direction of trade a question for the comparative 
statics of enclosure costs, E. 




. Recall that autarky equilibrium occurs where the grain 
market clears and social income equals expenditure. The cloth market clearing condition has 
nothing interesting to tell us, because demand for a numeraire has no interesting expenditure 
function interpretation. It is in any case redundant—the emergence of Walras’ law. The amount 
of cloth demanded is social income minus what is spent on grain; with social income as pG+C, 




To see what difference these conditions make, it is useful to drop temporarily the 
enclosure equilibrium condition (10)and to consider the fixed-enclosure grain supply curve, 
G
F(p;l
*,{q(l)},N,E)—that is, the supply curve derived under the assumption that no new 
property rights are created. The purpose of doing this is to bring together the whole set of factors 
influencing rent in autarky—which includes domestic demand—into a single rent function 
comparable to ρ
T(l
*). Using the fixed enclosure supply function breaks the slope of grain supply 
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Again partitioning (7) at l
* and applying Leibnitz rule gives 
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Differentiating the grain market clearing condition (13) with respect to l
*, using the 
decomposition of grain supply (18) gives Resources for the Future  Margolis and Shogren 
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That is, the direct impact of a change in l
* on grain output, plus the price-mediated 





















   (19) 
The sign follows because xpp is the slope of a compensated13 demand curve, hence 
negative; the term subtracted from it is positive; and the numerator is negative.   
Theorem 2: Under free trade, the North imports grain and the South imports 
cloth.(Proof: See Appendix.)  
The thin, superscripted S curves in Figure 2 are North and South supply curves for grain, 
G
T, and the D curves are demand (xp). Southern supply lies to the rights of Northern supply, 
because grain supply rises as a function E.  Because the North is richer, its demand lies to the 
right of Southern demand.  The world price, p
w, is that which equates world supply and demand, 
the horizontal sums of the national curves.  At this price, the North imports G
3-G
1 units of grain, 
and the South exports G
2-G






Theorems 1 and 2 show that international differences in the cost of enclosure help explain 
both the income differences that define the North-South axis, and the resource-intensive nature 
of Southern exports.  These results suggest that the trade pattern findings with exogenous 
property rights in the baseline case are unchanged when we allow for  endogenous enclosure.  
We now explore whether, as in those models, trade may be harming the South. Resources for the Future  Margolis and Shogren 
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Optimality 
 If price is exogenous, national income is given by 
  () ( ) ( ) ;{ ( )}, , , ;{ ( )}, , , ;{ ( )}, , ,
TT
cc c R p qa N E p G p qa N E C p qa N E =+ ll l  
R(p;{q(l)},ac,N,E)) is the free trade revenue function.  We state the optimality results as 
the derivative of the free trade revenue function with respect to the price of grain, which 
measures the change in nominal income earned by a nation that begins to export grain at a world 
price slightly above its autarky price. The change in nominal income necessary to compensate 
national consumers for that slight price increase is the slope of the expenditure function, which, 
by the envelope theorem, is the quantity of grain demanded.  In the neighborhood of the autarky 
price, if Rp > G
A (autarky equilibrium grain consumption), a country gains by exporting grain, 
and loses from importing grain. We now show that unless all land is enclosed, Rp<G
A
,  which 
implies that, in the neighborhood of the autarky price, exporting grain earns a nation less than the 
loss to consumers from the higher grain price.  
Expanding Rp using the endogenous enclosures supply curve slopes (16) and (17) yields, 
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The first integral on the right-hand side captures the impact of a price change on land-
owner production decisions.  It vanishes, parcel by parcel, because the term in angle brackets is 
                                                                                                                                                             
13 It would make more sense to use uncompensated demand here, but what we are calculating is the slope for first 
order changes. The only feature used here is that demand slopes down, which is true for uncompensated, too, except 
for Giffen goods. The expenditure function is useful for gains from trade results, and we’d just as soon stick with it 
rather than add more notation. Resources for the Future  Margolis and Shogren 
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zero by (8). This follows because, on enclosed land, the value added by a laborer just equals the 
value that laborer would add to cloth, so that expansion on this land has no first-order impact on 
revenue. In the second integral, the ratio is –1, while the remainder of the integrand is g(l). The 
integral is negative, reflecting the reduced income as labor moves to open land from the cloth 
sector, where it was more productive.   
The contribution of the last term is also unambiguously negative: the part in angle 
brackets is negative because the open access equilibrium has more labor on the land than the 
optimum for all prices, and everything in the ratio is positive by construction. This is a result of 
Lemma 2—all rents from enclosing the marginal parcel are absorbed in the costs of enclosure. 
Thus, while the sign of  p R is ambiguous, we know that 
T
p R G < . Intuitively,  p R equals the grain 
produced on private land minus the grain output lost by diverting workers to enclosure activities 
on the marginal parcel. This is sufficient to establish the following important result. 
Theorem 3: If the difference between autarky prices and the world price is first order 
small, and l
*<L in the South, then the North gains from trade and the South losses.  Proof: For 
the North, trade is movement to a lower p, for the South to a higher p. For first-order changes in 
price, the cost of achieving the autarky utility level is measured by the derivative with respect to 
p of the expenditure function,  (,)
AA
p x pu . By the envelope theorem,  (,)
AA
p x pu is grain demand 
in autarky, so   (,) ()
AA T A
p x pu Gp =  or the grain market doesn’t clear. We have just shown that 
() ()
T R pG p <  for all p within the cone of diversification. Hence,  () (,)
AA A
p R px p u < . Thus a 
move to p slightly above p
A increases the cost of achieving the autarky utility level by more than 
it increases income, while a slight fall in p reduces the cost of autarky utility by more than it 
reduces income . 
Theorem 3 says the South must lose from trade if the world price is the smallest possible Resources for the Future  Margolis and Shogren 
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increment above the autarky price.14 Equally, there must exist an interval (p
A,p
0) such that if the 
world price is in that interval, the South loses. But the theorem does not establish that the world 
price will always be within that interval, nor do we believe that it must be. As in Section 2, the 
second order curvature of the expenditure and revenue functions is such that they bend back 
towards one another after the intersection at the autarky price, which suggests a finite p
0, and 
thus the possibility that gains from trade will be restored if the price of grain goes high enough.   
Geometrically, this loss is captured in the relative slopes of the revenue and expenditure 
functions in Figure 3, which is exactly like Figure 1 except that units are now measured in the 
numeraire (cloth) rather than in the abstraction of dollars. The interpretation is the same: there is 
a cone of loss bounded by the autarky price. How much harm trade does to the South is 
measured by xp-Rp—the faster the gap between expenditure and revenue grows, the more 
harmful trade.  
Conclusions 
The idea that the poor suffer from trade with the rich is venerable, going back at least to 
Marx’s model of trade between classes15 through the import substitution advocates of the post-
depression era16 of whose trade barriers vestiges remain.  What we examine here is a rigorous 
version of a relatively new take on that venerable idea. In this view, the very efficiency of the 
markets and technologies at the center of the world economy—what we call the North—becomes 
                                                 
14 What is so special about autarky? If we take the trade-distorted status quo as p
A and change interpretation of all 
other “autarky” levels accordingly, the expenditure and revenue functions still cross at p
A , but the expenditure 
function slope is not longer G
T as above; it is instead G
T - grain exports. The revenue slope is unaffected. The 
question, then is whether, the terms subtracted from G
T in (20) exceed grain exports. It is unlikely that either result 
obtains in general, because there is no generalization of the relation between slopes of expenditure and revenue 
functions that exists in autarky for models without market failure – in those models, recall, equality of those slopes 
is the autarky market clearing condition. Away from the autarky price, the revenue function is steeper than the 
(equilibrium utility level) expenditure function in the export dimensions, capturing the increase in real income that 
comes from a terms of trade improvement.  
15 Which was recast as trade between nations by, inter alia, Frank, A. G. (1995). The Development of 
Underdevelopment. The international political economy and the developing countries. Volume 1.  Baran, P. A. 
(Ibid.). On the Political Economy of Backwardness.) 
16 See Krueger, A. O. (1997). “Trade Policy and Economic Development: How We Learn.” American Economic 
Review 87(1): 1-22. for an excellent review of this movement. Resources for the Future  Margolis and Shogren 
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a threat to the people of the South. The South’s failure, for example, to regulate the disposal of 
mine tailings would loom less large if it did not import from the North the shipping and financial 
services that make marginal minerals worth pursuing, and export in return a large share of the 
output.  In its broadest form, the question this paper addresses is whether this threat to the 
unprotected resources of the South can be so grave as to make trade harmful. 
The answer is yes, when the South’s institutional failure is rent dissipation on the 
hinterlands—even if exploiters of the hinterland are assumed to enclose parcels whenever the 
rents justify the costs.  We stress, however, that the net loss from trade is only a possible, not a 
necessary, result of the export of hinterland resources. Our results hold only to the extent that the 
actual structure of the world economy resembles our North-South models and world prices fall 
within the range for which those first-order losses dominate.  Both limits should be taken 
seriously.  
First, our South is probably not quite the same set of countries as, say, the set of countries 
classified as underdeveloped by the World Bank. The defining feature of our South is that its 
land is less protected by property rights to protect the land.  And while the South so defined is 
also poorer than the North, which corresponds to the South in the usual sense, this only need be 
so if all else is equal. The direction of trade, and the possibility of losses from trade, depend only 
on the relation between autarky and world prices, which, in reality, are influenced by variations 
in factor endowments, technology, and tastes. If a country is rich because, say, its citizens are 
full of human capital, but trades with a world that demands the output of its hinterland, then by 
our results it is South – it could lose from trade.  
An alternative interpretation of our normative results is to justify policies directed at the 
protection of a single resource. The second limitation, however, increases the difficulty of 
designing those policies.  Losses occur only within  a limited range of prices.  Therefore, simply 
observing that a nation exports hinterland resources is insufficient to justify the claim that 
reducing those exports will raise income. How truly formidable a task such justification would 
be can only be appreciated when one reflects on the pervasiveness of market failure. Losses for 
the South occur because resources are reallocated from functional to dysfunctional sectors. In 
order to apply this theory for the benefit of the South one would have to know which sectors Resources for the Future  Margolis and Shogren 
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suffer most from market failures. A trade intervention that reduces pressure on the forests of the 
South, for instance, does so in part by driving labor into manufacturing, where it adds to air 
pollution. The benefit-cost analysis required to track all such effects would be substantial. 
The North-South worldview offers a way around this immense need for data. If a nation 
believes itself to be especially filled with institutional malfunction, it can erect generalized 
barriers to trade. This is doubtless more wisely done as a group of nations, in order to take 
advantage of economies of scale and traditional sources of comparative advantage. It is also, 
arguably, what the real-world North has forced on the South in its efforts to protect agriculture 
and sectors that employ unskilled labor; and what the South has been left with from its own 
import-substitution policies. Should this, then, be allowed to stand? We could answer that if we 
knew the South’s cone of loss, but that may well prove as difficult to estimate as a whole set of 
industry-specific market failure measures. The hope offered by the North-South worldview is, if 
not dashed, at least soured. 
Finally, the actual development of institutions governing natural resources may differ 
from that in our model in two ways that would render our results irrelevant.  First, in our model, 
institutional development occurs only at an extensive margin.  Intensive margins are possible 
too, as when people in the hinterland increase their level of mutual monitoring. One reason 
losses are possible is that the enclosure response occurs only on a subset of the parcels threatened 
with increased rent dissipation. With an intensive margin this would no longer be the case. 
Second, the optimal enclosure rule plays a critical role, since no rent is earned by 
enclosing the marginal parcel. If the locals only enclose when the rents from doing so are, say, 
10 times the costs, enclosing the marginal parcel could release nine workers to other sectors for 
each one moved to the police.  The enclosure response would then partially compensate for 
higher losses from trade.  Whether it would compensate fully, fractionally, or excessively 
depends on how much land was marginal and how much submarginal, which stand in no Resources for the Future  Margolis and Shogren 
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necessary relation. 17 
These qualifications make the second-best case against free trade due to increasing rent 
dissipation conditional, even in theory. And even if the unconditional case is someday proven, a 
policymaker deciding whether to restrict trade would need detailed knowledge of the extent of 
market failure in every sector of the economy to know whether actual prices fall within the range 
in which losses from trade occur. It is hard to imagine that policymakers gifted with such an 
abundance of data could not monitor the sources of failure directly and achieve first-best 
solutions. 
                                                 
17 This is reminiscent of regulatory federalism (which regulation works best at which level of government). So 
viewed, the arguments for local action over trade action seem compelling. The locals are likely to know more about 
the resources they exploit and to be able to define property rights at lower cost than central authorities, i.e., through 
mutual monitoring. Thus local action is likely to be superior to any national-level policy, and trade intervention is 








































Figure 2: Partial Equlibrium Picture of Global 
Grain Market 











Figure 3: National income (R) and the cost of 
achieving the autarky utility level (x) as functions of the 
price of grain. 
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Appendix of Proofs 
Proof : Rent from parcel l is ρ(l)=pq(l)φ[n
*(l)]-wn
*(l).  The rent gradient in l is given  
by  
  () ()
*
** n
ρ ( )=pq ( ) n pq( ) n w
∂  ′′ ′   φ+ φ −    ∂
ll l l l
l
 (21) 
The coefficient of 
* n ∂
∂l (the term in big square brackets) is zero from (8) and φ(•)>0, 
p>0 by definition. Therefore ρ′(l) shares exactly the sign of q′(l).  
Proof of Lemma 1: Rent from parcel l is ρ(l)=pq(l)φ[n
*(l)]-wn
*(l).  The rent gradient in 
l is given  by  
  () ()
*
** n
ρ ( )=pq ( ) n pq( ) n w
∂  ′′ ′   φ+ φ −    ∂
ll l l l
l
 (22) 
The coefficient of 
* n ∂
∂l (the term in big square brackets) is zero from (8) and φ(•)>0, 
p>0 by definition. Therefore ρ′(l) shares exactly the sign of q′(l).  
Proof of Lemma 2: Applying the implicit function theorem to (8)  and (9) gives the 
derivatives with respect to l of n
* and n ˆ . The difference between those derivatives is 
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Both denominators on the right hand side are negative, so multiplying through by both 
preserves the sign  
() () () {} () () () () {}
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By assumption, q(l),φ(l),φ′(l),w are greater than zero, and 0, φ′′(l)<0 ∀ l. The parts in 
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Because 
* n n ˆ > , this implies the two conditional labor density curves  ˆ n( ) l and 
* n() l are 
coming closer together, which is the first part of the lemma. 
From Lemma 1 and  (10) ρ(l))≥wE for all l≤l
*, with strict equality at l
*.
 Expanding ρ(l) 
and dividing through by w, this implies 
 
** * * * p
q () n () En ()
w
 φ= +  ll l  (24) 






** * p ˆˆ q( ) n( ) n( )
w
 φ=  ll l  (25) 
The difference in labor densities is   
  { }
** * * * * * p ˆˆ n ()n ()E q () n () n ()
w
   −− = φ − φ    ll l l l  (26) 
The right hand side of (26) is unambiguously positive because 
* ˆ n( ) n ( ) >∀ ll l  and φ′>0. 
Thus  
** * ˆ n( ) n ( ) E −> ll .  Proof of Theorem 1: There are three cases to consider.  
Case I: E is very high in both countries, resulting in a corner solution to (10) with l
*=0. In 
this case, no labor is used in enclosure, and the income is the same in both countries. 
Case II: E is in an intermediate range, resulting in interior equilibria for l
*. From (5) the 
wage is the same in both countries.18 Therefore the rent gradient ρ(l) is the same in both 













                                                 
18 The equality of the wage, recall, is derived from the assumption of a Leontieff production function and the choice 
of numeraire, and is therefore as general as the former. Resources for the Future  Margolis and Shogren 
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which says  l
* falls when E rises for interior solutions.  






*, which is calculated by 
partitioning (7) at l
















Equation (28) says that marginally higher enclosure cost results in less grain output for 
interior l
*. We next show that higher E also results in less cloth output; lower income then 
follows trivially from lower output in both sectors. 
Totally differentiating (11)and setting 
* 0 dp dW dN d = === l   gives 
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, which proves that high enclosure 
costs is associated with low social income for interior solutions.  Resources for the Future  Margolis and Shogren 
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Case III: If E is very low in both countries so that l
*=L, there is no difference in enclosure or grain 
production. Income is lower where E is high because more labor is reallocated from cloth 














. Because E does not appear 




























. Because the 
South has higher E, the South has a lower autarky price of grain, and the North has a lower 
relative autarky price for cloth. The trade pattern then follows from the general principle of 
comparative advantage. 
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